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Inside Baseball's Salary Arbitration Process*
ROGER I. ABRAMSt
'EBvegy hitter Iface is a man tIying to take money out of my pocket"
- Early Wynn
Baseball's salary arbitration process began modestly in 1974. Dick Woodson, a
right-handed pitcher with a 10-8 record for Minnesota in 1973, sought a salary of
$30,000. His dub, the penurious Twins, offered him $23,000. Woodson pre-
vailed when the salary arbitrator selected his salary demand over the dub's offer.
His victory was a harbinger of things to come for those players who would pre-
vail in salary arbitration. On May 4, less than three months after winning his
case, the Twins traded Woodson to the Yankees for the remainder of his fifth
(and final) season in the major leagues.
Baseball's version of salary arbitration is unique in American labor relations.
Within twenty-four hours of the hearing, salary arbitrators must select either the
player's demand or the dub's offer. There can be no compromise, no explanation
and no delay. These essential characteristics are designed to make salary arbitra-
tion so risky and the outcome so unpredictable that overwhelmingly the parties
settle their disputes privately.
The final-offer baseball salary arbitration process has evolved over twenty-five
years, and the "numbers" have changed considerably. In 1998, Bernie Williams
demanded $9 million; the Yankees offered $7.5 million. They settled before the
hearing for $8.3 million, an increase of three million over the center fielder's
1997 salary. In 1999, Derek Jeter, the Yankees' classy shortstop, hit the arbitra-
tion jackpot on his first visit. A panel of three arbitrators chose his demand of $5
million over the dub's offer of $3.2 million. Jeter scored the first player victory
*. This article is a portion of a work in progress, The Mony Pitch: Baseball Salagy Arbitration
andFree Agenfy, to be published by Temple University Press in 2000.
t. Dean and Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. J.D.
Harvard 1970; B.A. Cornell 1967.
56 Roundtable
of the 1999 arbitration season after the clubs had swept the first five litigated
cases.
Even players who proceed to arbitration and lose, leave as multi-millionaires.
Johnny Damon, the Royals' fine young outfielder, lost his case, but upped his
salary from $460,000 in 1998 to $2.1 million in 1999, the club's final offer. Da-
mon seems a sure bet to join baseball salary elite if he continues to compile im-
pressive statistics at the plate and in the field, although likely with a club other
than the low-revenue Royals. Many other players eligible to file for salary arbitra-
tion threaten to use the process to leverage higher pay levels. To avoid salary
arbitration, some clubs have offered their junior star performers multi-year con-
tracts at premium rates.
Over the past quarter century, some players have won impressive victories in
salary arbitration. Bruce Sutter won the Cy Young Award in 1979 as an ace relief
pitcher. The Chicago Cubs closer left arbitration in 1980 with $700,000. In 1982,
Fernando Valenzuela, a tremendous gate attraction for the Dodgers and the
leader of its staff, won $1 million in salary arbitration following only his second
season in the majors. Sutter and Valenzuela set new levels for junior star pitchers
that was soon reflected in salary negotiations for both salary arbitration eligible
and free agent hurlers.
Baseball's salary arbitration process is driven by the numbers, the players' per-
formance statistics that club and player advocates shape into persuasive argu-
ments. When I hear salary arbitration cases, as I have in 1986, 1998 and 1999, I
think of how important each game and each at bat is for the pay level of players
who will be eligible for salary arbitration. As Kevin Costner, playing the weath-
ered former major league catcher, said in the movie "Bull Durham," twenty-five
hits over a full season of five hundred at bats make the difference between a .250
and a .300 hitter. One hit a week, any kind of hit anytime in a game, converts
into millions of dollars and an extended major league career. A few more safeties
with men in scoring position and a player might drive in a hundred runs, a very
important production plateau. On the other hand, a starting pitcher who throws
a few more hanging curves might be relegated to the bullpen for long relief, sent
down to the minors, or even given his unconditional release. Each event during a
long baseball game season is magnified in salary arbitration.
Early Wynn, the Hall-of-Fame right hander for the Senators, Indians and
White Sox who won three hundred games from 1939-1965, was quite perceptive
when he said that when he was on the mound he was involved in a contest for
money with the hitters he faced. Wynn was also asked if he would throw at his
own mother if she were up at bat. He replied: "It would depend on how well she
was hitting."
ORIGINS
Baseball's salary arbitration traces its origin back more than a century to the
procedures used to resolve labor-management negotiating disputes in unionized
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sectors of the economy, such as the coal mining, newspaper, and clothing indus-
tries. Unlike arbitrators today whom employers and unions appoint to resolve
grievances under the terms of their collective bargaining agreements, in these
instances the arbitrators wrote the actual terms of the contracts for the parties.
Today's salary arbitrators determine the most important term of a ballplayer's
contract, his salary for the coming season.
Baseball first used the term arbitration more than a hundred years ago, al-
though it had a very different connotation. Before its merger with the American
League, the National League called its council of owners that administered
league policy its "board of arbitration." The league did not intend the board to
be neutral, but rather act as the instrument of baseball's management.
In 1908, Pittsburgh Pirates outfielder Tommy Leach also used the term "arbi-
tration" to describe the mechanism he proposed to settle his salary dispute with
dub management. He suggested appointing a panel of three "arbitrators" from
the local business community-one of his choice, the second chosen by the
club, and the third selected by the two appointed arbitrators. The panel would
then set Leach's salary. Pirates owner Barney Dreyfuss declined to participate in
this novel procedure, because he neither had to nor wanted to. Instead, he of-
fered Leach an ultimatum to accept his terms or leave baseball. Leach signed.
Salary arbitration was first used to settle pay disputes in professional sports in
the National Hockey League in 1970. Hockey's process uses a single permanent
arbitrator who is not limited to the final choices of the parties in setting a
player's salary. In fact, he is almost certain to select a compromise compensation
figure between the two extremes presented by the parties to the dispute. In addi-
tion, the parties expect the arbitrator to submit a detailed written explanation of
his reasoning. The hockey collective bargaining agreement specifies the factors
the arbitrator must consider, including the player's overall performance, number
of games played, length of service in the league and with the dub, contribution
to the competitive success (or failure) of the dub in the preceding season, any
special qualities of leadership or public appeal of the player, and the pay of com-
parable players. In effect, the impartial arbitrator determines the player's market
value and orders his club to pay it. Although hockey's salary arbitrator criteria
mirror those used in baseball, the procedures used in the two sports are quite
different.
Baseball's salary arbitration is a process designed never to be used. Although it
has not been totally successful in avoiding all hearings, salary arbitration has sub-
stantially achieved its primary goal of private settlement. If the parties cannot
settle their differences privately, baseball's salary arbitration provides a quick,
informal, and, most importantly, a final resolution of the salary dispute. There
are no appeals from arbitrators' decisions, and the ballplayers report to spring
training under signed one-year contracts.
1999] "
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SALARY ARBITRATION CRITERIA
Since 1972, baseball club owners and the players association have included a
provision in their collective bargaining agreement that specifies the criteria their
arbitrators must use to decide disputes in salary arbitration. These are the rele-
vant terms of their economic marketplace. They also list the factors arbitrators
may not consider. For the parties, a fair outcome is one consistent with these
norms.
The current contract provides that all players with at least three years, but
fewer than six years, of major league service are eligible for arbitration. A player
with at least two years, but less than three years, of major league service is eligi-
ble for salary arbitration if "he has accumulated at least 86 days of service during
the immediately prior season" and "he ranks in the top seventeen percent" of
the players in the two-year service group in terms of major league service. The
eligibility of these "super-two's," as the parties call them, is obviously the result
of a compromise reached during collective bargaining negotiations between
owners and the players association.
The choices the parties made in their collective bargaining agreement and the
alternative variables they discarded demonstrate the assumptions that underlie
baseball's salary system. Article VI, Section F(12) provides:
(A) The criteria will be the quality of the Player's contribution to his Club dur-
ing the past season (including but not limited to his overall performance, special
qualities of leadership and public appeal), the length and consistency of his ca-
reer contribution, the record of the Player's past compensation, comparative
baseball salaries..., the existence of any physical or mental defects on the part
of the Player, and the recent performance record of the Club including but not
limited to its League standing and attendance as an indication of public accep-
tance...
(B) Evidence of the following shall not be admissible:
(1) The financial position of the Player and the Club;
(ii) Press comments, testimonials or similar material bearing
on the performance of either the Player or the Club, except
that recognized annual Player awards for playing excellence
shall not be excluded;
(iii) Offers made by either Player or Club prior to arbitration;
(iv) The cost to the parties of their representatives, attorneys,
etc.;
(v) Salaries in other sports or occupations.
Although this provision specifies the relevant criteria, it does not weigh those
factors. The parties direct their arbitrators to assign "such weight to the evidence
as shall appear appropriate under the circumstances," a slippery concept at best.
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PLAYER PERFORMANCE
It is foreseeable that an analysis of the salary arbitration criteria will point in
different directions for each player. Normally, an eligible ballplayer files for sal-
ary arbitration after a very good season, known as his "platform year." His most
recent performance is likely to outshine his career performance, and the player's
final salary demand is likely to reflect those recent accomplishments. Manage-
ment's final offer normally gives greater weight to the player's performance over
his entire career. If the player has just completed a blue-ribbon year, it follows
that his career statistics will not be as impressive.
Article VI, Section F(12), specifies a matching pair of criteria-past season
and career performance--and leaves it to the salary arbitrators the task of decid-
ing how they should be applied in any given case. A player who has a spectacular
platform year may have reached a new plateau of performance. On the other
hand, a career record with fewer stellar performances might suggest the prior
season was an aberration.
In practice, the most important criterion in baseball's wage system is the salary
paid to other major league ballplayers whose performance was comparable to the
player in salary arbitration. The concept of pay comparability in baseball is quite
revolutionary. Although independent entrepreneurs, club owners are compelled
to "meet the competition" when it comes to paying salaries because of salary
arbitration.
The parties do not expect their salary arbitrators to predict a player's perform-
ance, but rather to assess his prior experience: What kind of player is this? Is this
a superstar or a journeyman? What is this player worth within baseball's estab-
lished salary structure? After considering these normally conflicting data, arbitra-
tors choose between the final positions of the player and his dub.
THE SUBSIDIARY FACTORS
The collective bargaining agreement lists additional relevant criteria for the
salary arbitration process. One criterion is "the existence of any physical or men-
tal defects on the part of the Player." In at least one salary arbitration case, this
factor seemed determinative. In 1982, Dodgers' pitcher Steve Howe filed for
salary arbitration after three solid seasons as a relief pitcher-the first in 1980 as
the National League Rookie of the Year. Howe had become addicted to cocaine,
however, mixing the illegal drug into his alcoholic binges. After the 1982 season,
at the urging of his wife, his agent and his dub, Howe went to the Meadows in
Arizona, a well-known rehabilitation center. He then filed for salary arbitration,
not necessarily the smartest move after such a public confirmation of his "physi-
cal or mental defect." He lost his case before the arbitrator. Players with sub-
stance abuse problems will suffer in the salary negotiation process. Similarly,
players who spend extended periods on the disabled list will likely fail to achieve
all their salary aspirations.
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It is difficult to gauge what impact, if any, the other criteria might actually
have on salary arbitrators. For example, how would the "recent performance
record of the Club, including but not limited to its League standing and atten-
dance as an indication of public acceptance" affected the outcome the outcome
of a case? Would a player who would otherwise lose his case prevail because his
winning club played to sold-out crowds and won the pennant? Because arbitra-
tors decide cases without writing opinions, we may never know if these ancillary
criteria are considered at all.
THE PROHIBITED FACTORS
The parties' collective bargaining agreement prohibits salary arbitrators from
considering a series of factors that many would consider relevant to the determi-
nation of salary. The arbitrators may not consider the "financial position" of the
player and the club. Although an employer's ability to pay is customarily consid-
ered in setting workers' salaries in other contexts, in baseball that factor lies out-
side the foul lines of salary arbitration. This prohibition reinforces the parties'
basic understanding that there is one thirty-team market of fungible employers.
The parties also prohibit their arbitrators from considering media comments
about players. If a player performed well based on his statistics, that will tell his
story, not the columns of local sports writers. Perhaps the parties knew that once
the floodgates were opened for press accounts, there would be no stopping
point. Press comments tend to come in matching pairs as well: A player who is a
bum to some is a Babe to others. There is one exception to this ban: recognized
annual player acknowledgments for playing excellence, such as the Golden
Glove fielding awards, the new Hank Aaron award for the best hitter, Cy Young
pitching awards and other similar performance honors.
As is common in all forms of arbitration, various offers made by either the
club or the player prior to arbitration cannot be raised at the hearing. The own-
ers and the players association have created a process designed to encourage
settlement. If attempts to settle could later be offered as evidence in arbitration,
it would chill that effort at private resolution. Similarly, the parties have banned
mention during salary arbitration of the costs of their representatives and attor-
neys, matters not really relevant to the arbitrator's task.
Finally, the parties have wisely excluded evidence of salaries in other sports or
occupations from salary arbitration. Again, it is not relevant within the closed
marketplace of baseball where salaries are supposed to be based on baseball
player performance what a basketball player or a movie star earns. There is no
way to evaluate what these other entertainers contributed to their enterprises.
Salary arbitrators have enough of a challenge trying to measure a baseball player's
contribution to the success of his baseball club.
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TIMETABLE AND PROCEDURES
The timetable for arbitration begins right after the World Series ends. Each
fall the owners' Player Relations Committee (PRC) and the Major League Base-
ball Players Association jointly select a roster of about two-dozen salary arbitra-
tors. These arbitrators are experienced neutrals, typically members of the honor-
ary National Academy of Arbitrators, who have resolved labor grievance cases
for decades. Most are also veterans of the baseball salary arbitration process.
They have proven they can work within the contract's strict protocols. In early
November, the parties inform the arbitrators of their selection and request dates
each would be willing to reserve to hear cases during the first three weeks of the
following February. After salary arbitration eligible players and their dubs invoke
arbitration, the PRC and the union inform the arbitrators in late January how
many of their offered dates they will need for hearings.
Although they are resolving disputes involving millions of dollars, salary arbi-
trators are paid a flat fee of $750 for each case scheduled, plus expenses for
travel and lodging. In addition, arbitrators are paid up to one day "study time"
for each case actually heard. Typically, more than 80% of their scheduled cases
will settle after they are scheduled, but before the cases are actually heard in Feb-
ruary.
Arbitrators have no idea which players' cases they have been assigned. Per-
haps this is to keep the neutrals from doing research about the players before the
hearings. The players and the dubs apparently do know who will be their arbitra-
tors. (In my 1999 cases, the names of the arbitrators on the panel were affixed to
the parties' written briefs submitted at the hearing but prepared beforehand.)
Following the calendar set out in the collective bargaining agreement, in Janu-
ary the dubs and the eligible players exchange final salary figures for the coming
season. The sites for the February hearings alternate annually between the east
and west coasts-one year in Tampa or Orlando, the next in Phoenix or Los
Angeles. The cases are presented in arbitration by the player's agent (customarily
with vigorous assistance from attorney Michael Weiner of the players associa-
tion) and the management representative, usually outside counsel, assisted by
lawyers from the commissioner's office. Increasingly, clubs are turning to attor-
neys from Morgan, Lewis & Bockius in Washington, D.C., to present their cases
in arbitration.
THE SETTLEMENT IMPERATiVE
The final offer design of the arbitration process insures that the clubs and the
players will resolve most cases without the actual involvement of the arbitrators.
The final offer aspect of baseball salary arbitration pressures the parties to move
their positions closer together. Let us use a hypothetical case to explain how this
settlement imperative operates.
1999]
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Assume that during salary negotiations a salary arbitration eligible player de-
mands two million dollars and his club offers him one million. The parties know
that in arbitration the panel must decide which position-the player's or the
club's-is closer to the real market value of the player based on comparisons
with other players of similar experience and performance. The mid-point be-
tween the parties' positions in our hypothetical case is $1.5 million, and let us
assume that this is close to the real market value of the player's services. When
the arbitration panel hears this player's case, it must decide whether the player is
worth more or less than this "break point" between the two final offers.
It is to the strategic advantage of both parties when they submit their final of-
fer and demand that it to be closer to the real market value than the other party.
The final position closer to the real value of the player will prevail in arbitration.
The club certainly recognizes the player might be worth more than one million
and the player also knows he may be worth less than two million. Long before
the arbitration hearing and the submission of final figures, their initial bargaining
positions begin to change. Both parties seek to present the more reasonable final
position. The club may offer the player $1.2 million, now only $300,000 away
from what we have assumed is the player's real market value. Not to be outdone,
the player responds with a demand of $1.7 million, only $200,000 away from the
real market value. The club will likely move again closer to the mid-point, as will
the player. As the difference between the parties' positions narrows, the oppor-
tunity for settlement increases.
There are many advantages to settling a dispute short of arbitration. First, the
arbitration hearing itself imposes costs on the parties. It tends to strain the rela-
tionship between the player and his club. Second, if they settle, the parties can be
creative in designing a compensation package, including bonuses, for example, or
a no-trade clause. They can agree to a multi-year deal. On the other hand, the
product of salary arbitration is a standard player contract for a single year at a
defined salary. (It does not even guarantee the salary to the player, who, under
the collective bargaining agreement, can be released with only thirty to forty-five
days of pay.) Finally, a settlement can build the parties' relationship rather than
rupture it. Both parties win to some degree. In salary arbitration, there is always
one winner and one loser.
The settlement dynamic operates in baseball salary arbitration because it is
based on the final-offer principle. If the arbitrator could select any salary, as in
hockey salary arbitration, he is likely to pick some compromise position which he
determines is the actual market value of the player. In that case, it would be best
strategically for management to decrease its offer and the player to increase his
demand. In this way, the arbitrator would have more room to "compromise"
toward one side or the other.
By comparison, in final-offer arbitration the best final position is the more
reasonable one, the one closer to the real market value, wherever that is. One
thing for sure; it is unlikely to be near the parties' starting positions, and more
likely to be somewhere near the middle of their two positions. Parties move their
positions because they want to capture through the salary arbitration process the
difference between what the player is really worth and what he demands or what
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the dub offers. Winning means being more reasonable, the key which unlocks
the door to settlement.
Obviously, some cases are not settled. A few cases are actually tried in salary
arbitration each February. What explains these aberrations? There may be a
number of reasons why parties do not settle their disputes without going to a
hearing.
1. Some players enter salary arbitration with distinctly mixed profiles. A
player who has had a very good season prior to arbitration, his platform year,
may have had previous seasons of substantially lesser quality or he may have
spent a considerable amount of time on the disabled list accumulating major
league service credit. The arbitrators are told to consider both the player's
prior year and his entire career, but they are not instructed how to weigh these
variables. If they point in very different directions, there may be little indica-
tion of the player's real market value. The parties might test the waters of arbi-
tration in these very tough cases rather than settle.
2. Other cases are not resolved prior to arbitration because the club does
not think it has the financial resources to pay anything more than it has of-
fered the player. This is no defense in salary arbitration, however. In fact, a
dub cannot even mention its inability to pay at the hearing. Yet, the opportu-
nity to prevail in salary arbitration at a more affordable salary will encourage
management to take a chance and roll the dice. If it loses, it can trade the
player, and it often does.
3. Even if management has the resources to pay a particularly accomplished
junior player, a voluntary agreement between the dub and player has horizon-
tal impacts beyond the case at hand. Club management maintains contracts
with twenty-five ball players on the active roster, and a generous voluntary
agreement with one player will encourage others to demand more. On the
other hand, if the dub is ordered to pay a player a high salary as a result of sal-
ary arbitration, management can argue to its other players that this salary was
imposed; it neither is dub policy nor should it be considered a precedent in
other negotiations.
4. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, some cases are not settled without
a salary arbitration hearing because of the personalities and egos of the par-
ticipants. A particularly irascible agent may make settlement discussions dis-
tasteful and may stretch a player's salary demand beyond market norms. A
player may think he is the finest major leaguer since Honus Wagner. A general
manager may refuse to pay an uncooperative player what he is really worth.
Some obstinate owners will simply refuse to recognize the true market value
of their arbitration-eligible players on "principle." Personal chemistry (or lack
thereof) at the negotiation table may make a voluntary settlement impossible.
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THE SCORECARD
Management has done extremely well in the salary arbitration forum, although
it regularly complains about the results of the process. There has been a total of
417 cases heard in salary arbitration since 1974. The clubs have prevailed in 236
of those cases, the players in 181. In only five years (1980, 1981, 1989 1990, and
1996) did players prevail in more cases than their clubs:
Year Owners Players
1999 9 2
1998 5 3
1997 4 1
1996 3 7
1995 6 2
1994 10 6
1993 12 6
1992 11 9
1991 11 6
1990 10 14
1989 5 7
1988 11 7
1987 16 10
1986 20 15
1985 7 6
1984 6 4
1983 17 13
1982 14 8
1981 10 11
1980 11 15
1979 6 8
1978 7 2
(There was no arbitration in 1976-77)
1975 9 6
1974 16 13
Totals 236 181
These figures may indicate that player agents misread the market more often
than club representatives. Alternatively, it may show that salary arbitrators are
more reluctant to award increasingly high player salaries then they are to grant
management a good deal on a young player's services.
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PROCEDURES
Under their current collective bargaining agreement, the parties agreed to
phase in a new panel system using three arbitrators to hear cases in lieu of single
arbitrators. In 1998, panels heard half the cases, increasing to three-quarters in
1999, and all cases in 2000. Management pressed for this change during the tu-
multuous 1994-96 labor dispute, believing that three-member panels were less
likely to produce clearly erroneous decisions. However, the results from the first
two years of panel implementation show no significant difference in outcomes
between panels and single arbitrators.
I served as a member of these new three-arbitrator panels in February 1998
and 1999. Comparing the experience -with my single arbitrator cases, I found no
real difference, other than in the increased transaction costs imposed on the arbi-
trators to meet after the hearing and review all the evidence together. In each
instance, the arbitrators met for hours, reviewing the arguments made by the
parties and analyzing the copious data. Sometimes, we reached the conclusion we
had all thought was appropriate at the outset. In others, we changed our minds.
Although the experience to date suggests there is no difference in outcomes
between panels and single arbitrators, the three-member approach diminishes
the risk of a misreading statistical materials. In any case, by 2000 the single arbi-
trator option was history.
PRESENTING A CASE
The owners and the players association designed the salary arbitration process
to set the compensation for those players who have already shown the ability to
play at the major league level. Under the vestige of baseball's century-old reserve
system, dub management retains the exclusive right to the player's services until
he is eligible for free agency after six years of major league service. The salary for
arbitration-eligible players, however, is set by what might be termed the "major
league scale." In salary arbitration, the clubs and the players, through their
agents, demonstrate to the arbitrators where the player should be situated in the
established salary market of major league baseball
The final-offer protocol of salary arbitration not only avoids compromise de-
cisions by the neutrals; it also focuses the parties' presentations. Each side must
explain to the tribunal why the player is worth more (the player) or less (the club)
than the mid-point between the final offer and the final demand. The club need
not defend its lower offer nor must the player justify his higher demand. It is
sufficient to focus on the mid-point
Although the presentations of the parties are based on the same statistical
data, their pictures of reality differ greatly. There normally are fundamental dif-
ferences between the parties in their perceptions of the player's value to his club.
At times, arbitrators may wonder whether the club and the agent are talking
about the same ballplayer.
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Baseball has always been a game of inventive statistics, but now they convert
directly into dollars. With the ready availability of computer data bases, salary
arbitration has become a furious battle of statistics.Partes in salary arbitration
have customized these data to meet their partisan needs. Afficionados of the
game, in particular Bill James, have devised complex formulae within the new
discipline of "sabermetrics" to describe a player's contribution to his club's suc-
cess, but parties in salary arbitration devise additional statistical measures if they
help their cases, even if they do not always make much baseball sense.
Today's salary arbitration hearing room table is adorned with laptop comput-
ers capable of generating any needed comparison in an instant. Every claim is
met with a counterclaim until the arbitrators are left with a huge pile of numbers.
Player performance is chopped and diced, particularized and dissected. Anything
not easily convertible into numerical terms, such as team leadership, hustle and
courage in the face of debilitating injury, seems to play no role.
The time limits for the arbitration hearing set forth in the agreement--one
hour for each side followed by a half-hour rebuttal-have been stretched in
practice so that each party has a greater opportunity to rebut and clarify. With
millions of dollars at stake, arbitrators understandably are loath to make a judg-
ment unless the parties have had a full chance to present their arguments. Some
salary arbitrators have been so overwhelmed by the numbers that they would
prefer if the parties would supply data long before the hearing so it might be
digested. Alternatively, they would want more time after the hearing to review
the submissions. Neither alternative seems likely to be adopted.
Hearing a case in salary arbitration is "heavy lifting." Stats are piled upon stats
in rapid fashion. The skilled advocates of the parties seem determined to present
their whole case without taking a breath. Lest they omit some salient fact an
arbitrator might find probative later that night, the parties err on the side of
overkill.
THE RELEVANT STATISTICS
Originally, salary arbitrators were not selected based on their knowledge of the
national pastime. There is a story told about a hearing involving a relief pitcher in
the 1970s, when, after hours of statistical presentation, the neutral asked: "Now
what is a save?" Both sides were dismayed, but carefully explained to the befud-
dled neutral the nature of a save. In the process, of course, the parties realized
their presentation of sophisticated statistics wasted time and energy. Today, vir-
tually all salary arbitrators are veterans of the process and have been schooled in
the game's parameters and statistics.
The winning strategy in salary arbitration is to present in simple, straightfor-
ward terms the right class of comparable players focusing on the core character-
istics of the player whose case is being adjudicated. Parties would be far better
off using a pinpoint approach to the delivery of statistics, rather than a scatter
gun. A team wins games by scoring runs. Run production-runs scored and
[6:55
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RBIs-is the key offensive statistic. While batting average is interesting, it does
not tell you very much about a player's contribution to team success. Slugging
percentage-total bases divided by times at bat-is a more important measure,
although not as useful as total run production. It would be useful to employ even
more targeted statistics, such as ran production in key game situations. Again,
the parties must remember that the core issue is not how well the player per-
formed, but how well he performed compared to otherplayers.
For pitchers, the vital statistic in salary arbitration is not wins and loses be-
cause pitchers cannot control their dub's run production. A good pitcher on a
bad dub should be considered comparable to a good pitcher on a great dub,
although the latter is likely to have a much better winning percentage. Earned
ran average is a useful measure, remembering of course, that ERA is higher in
the American League than the National because of the presence of the desig-
nated hitter. Opponent's batting average may be an interesting statistic, but it is
far more telling when pinpointed to OBA with men on base or men in scoring
position. Walks can hurt and strikeouts can help, but neither area is as important
as stopping ran production.
Baseball people (as opposed to baseball lawyers) know what on-field perform-
ance wins or loses games. They know, for example, that a critical event in an
inning is whether the lead-off hitter gets on base, because he is likely to score.
They know that a pitcher's primary responsibility is to keep that first hitter off
the base paths. A timely hit or a strikeout is vitally important. Game-winning (or
game-losing) events should be the focus of the statistics offered in salary arbitra-
tion. A batting average padded in meaningless at bats is not as important as pro-
duction in run-scoring situations when a game is on the line.
Arbitrators can understand why either the club's representative or the player's
agent might shy away from these targeted statistics. They might not present what
the partisans see as their best case. Nonetheless, these are the important statis-
tics, and the salary arbitrators should not allow other less meaningful numbers
affect their deliberations. All statistics are not equal in the arbitration calculus.
It is also possible that some data submitted by the parties in salary arbitration
is based on incorrect or questionable assumptions. There is no way that salary
arbitrators can independently evaluate the correctness of the data. We must leave
it to the opposing parties to analyze the submissions and make those corrections
known to the arbitration panel at the hearing.
A STRATEGY FOR EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION
Parties in salary arbitration must develop a theory to their case. Instead of fo-
cusing on some cohesive theory, parties now spend half their first allotted hour
statistically glorifying or demonizing the player. It would be better were an agent
to say simply. 'This is a case about a shortstop with great range and play-making
abilities. His contribution to the dub at the plate is not as important as his play
in the field. We will compare his performance to the other premier shortstops in
the league who are valued for their fielding, and that will justify a salary figure
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above the midpoint between his demand and the club's offer." In return, the
club might say: "This is a case about a good shortstop who is not yet in the class
of premier middle infielders. While we appreciate his fielding abilities, his failure
to perform at the plate, especially in key game situations, has diminished his
overall contribution to the club."
When I start a salary arbitration hearing, I ask myself: "What kind of player is
this?" "What job was this player hired to perform?" Pitchers, for example, fall
into five different categories-starters, closers, set-up men, lefty specialists, and
mop-up men. Some players may be primarily valued for their defensive perform-
ances, such as middle infielders and catchers. Others are adequate fielders, but
are prized for their power and clutch hitting or ability to get on base. Comparing
the performance and salaries of players who perform different roles for a base-
ball team is comparing apples with oranges.
Starting with these categories of the different kinds of players who make up a
major league team, I have a fairly good idea whether the parties' comparables are,
in fact, comparable. I then ask myself: "How well did this player perform the job
he was asked to do?" Within each of the job categories there are different levels
of performance. There are truly outstanding starting pitchers and quite ordinary
starting pitchers. In to which classification does this player fall?
Parties have always put a premium on glossy presentations of charts and
analysis. If they cannot convince the arbitrators on the statistical merits, perhaps
they can dazzle them with their fancy reproductions and bright colors. An organ-
ized presentation is useful, however. Handing over one document at a time to
the panel is likely to get key documents mixed up in the arbitrators' briefcases. A
loose-leaf binder with tabs and an index is particularly helpful.
CURRENT ISSUES IN SALARY ARBITRATION
Salary arbitration remains a battle ground of statistics. The party that con-
structs the better argument on the numbers wins the case. Although owners and
players have had over twenty-five years of experience with the process, there
remains a collection of fundamental issues left unresolved, matters the parties
have left to their neutrals to handle on a case-by-case basis. The way arbitrators
resolve these issues may determine the outcome of many cases.
Regarding the critical variable of the comparables, a player would prefer to be
compared with players with more major league service than he has because it is
likely they would be earning a higher salary. The club would prefer the arbitra-
tors to compare the player with others in his "service group," that is, with the
same number of years of major league service. The relevant language in the sal-
ary arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement is particularly
unhelpful. It states:
The arbitrator or arbitration panel shall, except for a Player with five or more
years of Major League service, give particular attention, for comparative salary
purposes, to the contracts of Players with Major League service not exceeding
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one annual service group above the Player's annual service group. This shall not
limit the ability of a Player or his representative, because of special accomplish-
ment, to argue the equal relevance of salaries of Players without regard to serv-
ice, and the arbitrator or arbitration panel shall give whatever weight to such
argument as is deemed appropriate.
The paragraph is filled with ambiguities which can make an arbitration hearing
a free-for-all. Arbitrators are directed to give "particular attention" to the player's
service group and one service group above that service group. What does "par-
ticular attention" mean? There is escape language in the provision that allows for
comparisons without any regard to service because of a player's "special accom-
plishment." What does that mean?
The sernice group issue is important because there is a marked difference in
compensation between players with different amounts of service. The mean sal-
ary figures distributed at the February 1999 arbitration hearings showed as fol-
lows:
Service Group Mean Salary
Three years $1,052,483
Four years $1,626,893
Five years $2,476,495
Unless player compensation correlates perfectly with player performance (a
claim no one makes), it is likely that two players with about the same level of
performance but with different years of service will earn different salaries. When
arbitrators reach upwards in service groups to identify comparable players-
something the contract dearly authorizes, but does not mandate-the result is to
inflate salaries. If the arbitrators stick within a player's service group, particularly
good players are penalized.
Arbitrators can probably finesse this issue on a case-by-case basis. A player ac-
cumulates a year of major league service with 172 days on a major league roster.
In the early years of a player's major league career, it is likely he will spend Sep-
tember on the major league roster after it is expanded from twenty-five to forty
players. The following year, the player might start the season in the minors, be
called up to fill a particular need on the major league dub, and then return to the
minors. It may take two or three seasons for a player to accumulate a year of
major league service. Some players first qualify for salary arbitration after five or
more years of discontinuous play at the major league level. They are seasoned
players approaching their peak performance years. It seems to make sense to
compare those players with others with more years of major league service.
Years of major league service normally correlate with games played, at bats for
field players, and appearances for pitchers. It is possible that a player with three
years of service could have accumulated as many games played, at bats, or pitch-
ing appearances as players with four years of service. In addition, players in the
four-year service group may have spent time on the disabled list where they
would still accumulate major league service though they were not playing. Coin-
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paring players from different service groups with generally the same amount of
playing time also seems appropriate.
In any case, players included in the three-year service group include all players
with at least three years, but less than the additional 172 days on a major league
roster needed to move them on to the four-year category. It makes perfect sense
to compare a player with almost four years of service to those with four years of
service. (The obverse is also true. It is less appropriate, although not prohibited,
to compare a player with barely three years actual playing time to players in the
next higher service group.)
Another live issue in salary arbitration involves the use of what the parties call
look-back comparables. Assume the player in arbitration is a middle relief pitcher
with three or four years of service. The critical statistic for set-up men is a
"hold," defined in general terms as maintaining a club's lead so as to allow a
closer to obtain a save. Either side may introduce as comparables set-up men
who now have much more seniority in the league, but then "look back" to the
years when they had only three or four years of service. What was their perform-
ance then and what was their compensation?
Obviously, using look-back comparables requires caution. If all players are
paid more now than they were when those look-back comparables had three or
four years of service, the comparison is unfair. One way to evaluate this aspect
of the issue is to examine the inflation of player salaries. The average salary fig-
ures show as follows:
Year Three-Years Major Four-Years Major
League Service League Service
1991 $670,930 $1,194,205
1992 $855,880 $1,275,992
1993 $906,198 $1,667,404
1994 $1,092,179 $1,539,654
1995 $1,082,092 $1,999,746
1996 $1,042,118 $1,609,511
1997 $926,033 $1,666,583
1998 $1,041,025 $1,601,351
These average salary figures show that compensation for players with three
and four years of major league service has not increased since 1994. Although the
averages increase and decrease over time, there has not been player salary infla-
tion over that period among salary arbitration eligible players. Thus, look-back
comparables may have validity.
A third unresolved issue deals with how to value non-compensation provi-
sions commonly included in a negotiated contract, but not included in the stan-
dard uniform player contract a player receives after salary arbitration. Comparing
compensation figures is easy, but how do you value a no-trade clause? How do
[6:55
9IRide Baseballs SalagyArbitration 71
you value bonus provisions? What about a clause which guarantees payment for
the full term of the contract?
As with all matters in dispute between labor and management, these issues can
be resolved through collective bargaining or by interim agreements during the
term of the contract. The parties did address in their current agreement one issue
that had divided them for years: How do you account for a contract signing bo-
nus? It is to be allocated evenly across the entire length of a contract.
One procedural issue the parties did resolve in 1999 was the order of presen-
tation at the salary arbitration hearing. The collective bargaining agreement states
that each side has one hour to present its case followed by a half hour each for
rebuttal, but it says nothing about who proceeds first. It would be to a party's
advantage to have the last say and let his opponent go first. The general practice
in salary arbitration has always been for the player's side to present first. During
some 1998 salary arbitration hearings, however, player agents-in particular, the
articulate Dick Moss-strongly objected to the practice.
Before the 1999 arbitrations, the players association and the commissioner's
office reached a compromise on this issue. The parties must exchange all written
materials they intend to present in arbitration before the hearing begins, thus
affording the player agent the opportunity to anticipate the dub's arguments and
address them during his case in chief. With the pre-hearing document exchange,
the players association agreed to follow the practice of the player's agent pro-
ceeding first.
THE PLAYER'S ROLE
The ballplayer always attends his salary arbitration hearing, sitting quietly next
to his agent. A decade ago, it was not unusual for the player to say a few words
at his hearing, but that no longer appears to be the case. The player's participa-
tion did add a nice touch to the hearing. Now players just sit, even appearing
bored at times, listening to their agents extol their virtues and their dubs present
a litany of their failures. It would be useful if the player were offered the oppor-
tunity to say a few words.
The risks of injury to the relationship between the dub and its player from a
salary arbitration hearing are immense. It would not hurt a dub's chances for
success if its spokesperson explained that the player was a valuable asset to the
dub, recognizing at the same time that he was not perfect. No one is perfect.
THE END GAME
The arbitrators must reach a judgment on their case within twenty-four hours
of the hearing. The panel chair then has two ministerial tasks-first to telephone
the representatives of the owners and the union to report the outcome and sec-
ond to fill in the blank in paragraph two of the already-signed standard player
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contracts and mail them to the parties. Under the new tripartite panel approach,
in March the chair also reports to the parties what the vote was in the case.
Baseball management has criticized salary arbitration since its inception for in-
flating player salaries. There can be no doubt that players eligible for arbitration
earn more than those who have not accumulated the necessary major league
service to participate in the process, but few could have thought it would be
otherwise. Compensation for players eligible for salary arbitration, however, has
remained almost stable over the past six years while free agent salaries have bal-
looned in the competitive free market. It might be argued that salary arbitration
has controlled salary inflation in a way the owners are unable to do themselves.
Unlike the experience in other professional sports, there are no "holdouts" in
baseball among players eligible to use the salary arbitration process. Each case is
resolved within twenty-four hours of the hearing, and the player reports to
spring training under a signed contract with his club. A defining characteristic of
salary arbitration is its finality. Management's understandable concerns about the
outcomes of some arbitration cases must be balanced against the value of this
certainty. The clubs will have their best talent on the field for the coming season.
Salary arbitration has changed as the parties have learned to work within the
system to achieve their goals. Perhaps the most important recent development
was the pro-active effort by the commissioner's office to avoid management
losses in salary arbitration. In 1999, baseball officials urged clubs to settle cases
which they thought were likely to be decided in the player's favor in arbitration.
Rob Manfred, baseball's vice president for labor relations told the press: "We set
out at the beginning of the year to try and improve the clubs' level of prepara-
tion. We were pleased with the results." The strategy proved brilliant, at least in
terms of the 1999 results in arbitration. Management won nine cases against two
losses, its highest winning percentage ever.
What does this resounding management triumph indicate? Over the quarter
century of experience, management has consistently won more cases in arbitra-
tion each year than it has lost. The 1999 scoreboard was the most lopsided in the
history of salary arbitration, however. These results may show that player agents
were reaching too high, but why should that have been any different in 1999
then in any previous year? If it is not an aberration and is followed by similar
management successes in 2000, it may signal to eligible players that the salary
arbitration process is no longer a friendly field in which to play. This, in turn,
may result in even more settlements and far fewer, if any, cases actually tried.
Like the state under Marxist theory, baseball salary arbitration hearings may just
"wither away."
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